Can CEO's Holding Of Private Enterprises Restrain The Tunneling Of Large Shareholders

This paper explores the economic consequences of CEO shareholding based on the perspective of major shareholders Tunneling by constructing a principal-agent model that introduces a CEO equity incentive mechanism.Taking the A-share private enterprises listed on the Shanghai and Shenzhen stock exchanges from 2006 to 2018 as a sample,this paper empirically analyzes the impact of CEO shareholding on major shareholders' tunneling.The results show that(1)CEO shareholding can significantly inhibit the tunneling behavior of major shareholders,and the degree of tunneling is significantly lower in the companies that implement equity incentive for CEOs,which confirms the " synergistic effect" of CEO shareholding.(2)There is a significant positive U-shaped relationship between the level of CEO holdings and the tunneling of major shareholders,indicating that the shareholding of CEO has both benefit synergy effect and entrenchment effect.The U-shaped inflection point is 23.72%.When the shareholding level of the CEO is lower than 23.72%,the increase of the shareholding of the CEO is reflected as the benefit synergy effect,and when the shareholding level is higher than the inflection point,it is expressed as the entrenchment effect.At present,the shareholding ratio of CEO in China's CEO equity arrangement is generally lower than the inflection point.(3)When the CEO is a professional manager,the synergy effect and entrenchment effect of the CEO's shareholding still exist,and it is significantly higher than the sample of non-professional managers.(4)the CEO duality significantly negatively moderates the inhibitory effect of CEO shareholding on major shareholders Tunneling,and positively moderates the entrenchment effect of CEO shareholding on major shareholders Tunneling.That is to say,the benefit synergy effect of CEO shareholding is easier to be exerted in the enterprises with CEO separates from chairman of directors,and the entrenchment effect of CEO shareholding is more obvious in the combination of two roles.(5)further research found that the higher check-and-balance of stock ownership,the lower the proportion of independent directors,the lower the synergistic effect of CEO's shareholding and the higher the entrenchment effect,the easier it was for CEO's shareholding to assist major shareholders in emptying.