| Looking at the pitiful state of the United States Army in the period from 1939-1941, historians have found it difficult to explain how that same army could have contributed significantly to overall Allied victory in World War II. Often, historians merely chalk up America's role in the war as being one of productive capacity, smothering the Axis powers with unprecedented material resources and overwhelming firepower. While this thesis does explain to some degree the contribution of the United States to victory in World War II, it neglects the actions taken by the U.S. Army in the interwar period to prepare for possible future conflicts. The Army, beginning as early as 1918, undertook many separate actions that were intended to modernize its combat capabilities and effectiveness for a future war that many officers considered likely, if not imminent. Therefore, the contribution of the U.S. Army in World War II was not merely the application of the nation's immense resources but also the result of the dedication and work of visionaries and/or reformers within the interwar army. Against a backdrop of public resentment, political apathy, and budgetary constraints, reform-minded individuals such as Fox Conner, Frank Parker, Malin Craig, George Marshall, and many others, all fought to modernize the interwar Army and its combat capabilities. During the 1920s and 30s, these officers did their best to review past military operations and update the Army's war-fighting doctrines, develop new operational and tactical formations, motorize the entire army, develop new weapons systems, and successfully integrate the various parts of the army---Regulars, Reservists, and National Guard---into a capable fighting machine lacking only in time, money, and manpower. In doing so, the Army prepared itself far more completely than is generally thought for the role it would assume on the WWII battlefields of North Africa, Europe, and the Pacific. |
