Freedom of conscience and subjective right in Hegel's political philosophy

This dissertation analyzes the status of liberty of conscience in Hegel's political thought. I argue for the truth of the "compatibility thesis": Hegel's conception of the liberty of conscience is compatible with liberal conceptions of freedom of conscience. I demonstrate that Hegel's political thought satisfies both an individual-rights criterion, according to which individuals are entitled to significant protection from state interference in matters of conscience solely on the basis of their constitution as reflective agents, and a toleration criterion, according to which the state ought to exercise toleration with regard to the basic moral and religious convictions of its citizens.;Determinate rights to moral and religious self-determination stem from the notion of "subjectivity" developed in Hegel's political thought. I argue that while Hegel's criticisms of the moral conception of conscience can be profitably seen as directed against some of his idealist and romantic predecessors, those criticisms entail no specific political consequences. Questions concerning the status of liberty of conscience in Hegel's political thought are better approached through his treatment in the 1821 Philosophie des Rechts of subjective right within modern "ethical life." An examination of the role that subjective rights---that is, rights pertaining to individuals simply in virtue of their constitution as reflective agents---play in the theory of ethical life and in Hegel's explicit discussions of toleration provides resources for demonstrating the truth of the compatibility thesis.;However, in his later writings, Hegel supplements the individual agency-based account of the liberty of conscience with a religious and historical account of conscience. According to this later account, the claims of individual conscience derive their legitimacy from Protestant Christianity. Though this supplementary account threatens to undermine the compatibility thesis, I argue that examination of Hegel's earlier discussions of conscience in the 1807 Phanomenologie des Geistes demonstrates the priority of the agency-based account of the liberty of conscience in Hegel's thought.