The U.S. counterinsurgency doctrine in Thailand during the Vietnam War

In response to anti-colonial independence movements after World War Two, imperial powers developed counterinsurgency strategies based upon socioeconomic development, enhanced internal security and political reform. The United States formalized its doctrine in the United States Overseas Internal Defense Policy (USOIDP) to combat the perceived spread of monolithic communism. This doctrine contained strategies that were perceived to be successful in early counterinsurgency programs. The primary emphasis of this study is the American participation in counterinsurgency in Thailand during the Vietnam war using earlier programs for comparison.For this analysis primary and secondary materials were used. Much of the primary material reinforces the arguments that the assumptions drawn from the earlier counterinsurgencies are false. This argument is supported by the fact that the United States lacked proper understanding of the Thai insurgency and the leverage to control the counterinsurgency programs. Once the United States departed, Thailand was able to defeat the insurgency.