Reconstituting the Resource Curse After Authoritarianism: Parastatal Organizations, Violence and Legitimacy Making in Post-Invasion Ira

In this article, I expand the theory of conflict in rentier states by looking at the process of legitimacy making after the collapse of authoritarian regimes. Literature on the resource curse shows that in the absence of an authoritarian regime, resource dependent countries tend to collapse into violent conflict (Collier and Hoeffler 1998, 2002). And while there is a wealth of research on the relationship between resources rent and violence, the question of whether or not legitimacy making occurs in rentier states when the authoritarian state apparatus is weakened -- and what forms this process takes -- is not fully explored. I argue that not only rent is a source that fuels the diverse and competing claims by the different groups in the country, but it also provides the financial resources for these groups to pursue those claims with not only violence, but also through "buying" and creating legitimacy. Limiting ourselves to research that only examines the relationship between violent conflict and resources undermines our understanding of the full effect of the presence of resources in a country, how and why certain groups gain and maintain power, and the different layers of instability in that country. By drawing on the case of Iraq, my qualitative interviews with activists and journalists in Iraq provide evidence of the different techniques competing groups use to establish their power and authority. I find that the different competing groups engage in a unique and complex process of legitimacy making, and the failure or the success of that process plays a significant role in the survival of these group. This process seems particularly applicable and timely, even beyond Iraq, insofar as other states in the region (Libya) and elsewhere (Nigeria and Venezuela) are currently experiencing a similar confluence of a weak or failed state in the presence of oil revenues.