A return to realism: The failure of the Bush Doctrine as a paradigm for United States post -- Cold War foreign policy

During the Cold War the realist theory of international relations as formulated by Hans Morgenthau provided the theoretical underpinnings of U.S. foreign policy. Following the collapse of the Soviet Union in the early 1990s the U.S. searched for a new paradigm to guide its foreign policy. Many people argued that the nature of the post---Cold War international system with its many transnational issues that did not fall within the Cold War definition of national interests which meant that a realist foreign policy was no longer appropriate. The Clinton foreign policy had lacked a theoretical cohesiveness and as such was much more reactionary in responding to international issues and crises. In response senior members of the neoconservative foreign policy establishment formed the Project for a New American Century (PNAC) to present what they believed U.S. foreign policy should encompass. The election of George W. Bush and the attacks of September 11, 2001 provided the opportunity for former members of PNAC and now senior administration officials to implement their ideas in the form of the Bush Doctrine.;This thesis will demonstrate that the U.S. has been unable to address a broad range of global issues because of its inability to move beyond the narrowly defined concept of national interests that has framed its historical foreign policy decisions. The Bush Doctrine maintains a narrow definition of national interests that has a greater degree of global engagement, but does so largely within the scope of national security affairs and the so-called "war on terror". This represents a narrow definition of national interests and lacks an understanding of the interconnected nature of international issues. The failure of the Bush Doctrine over the past eight years and the reasons for this failure illustrates why the U.S. needs to return to a realist paradigm but with a broader definition of national interests to guide its foreign policy.;The war in Iraq is the primary application of the Bush Doctrine, in many ways the Doctrine was developed to provide justification for the war and to supply the framework for the future application of U.S. power. Success in Iraq was short-lived, within months of the invasion the limitations of U.S. strategy became evident. Too few soldiers and the lack of a comprehensive post invasion reconstruction plan led to the collapse of Iraq into a sectarian civil war with the U.S. trapped in the middle. The adherence of senior neoconservative members of the Administration to the failed strategy for three years resulted in the loss of thousands of lives, billions of dollars and the displacement of millions of refugees. The eventual recognition of this failure resulted in the removal of many of the neoconservatives with realists and the de facto end of the Bush Doctrine. The failure of the Bush Doctrine represents how U.S. foreign policy needs to recognize the interconnected nature of international issues. As a result it is necessary to have a broad definition of national interests. This can best be accomplished within the realist foreign policy paradigm that has traditionally guided U.S. foreign policy, to which the American people have grown accustomed and has become part of the political culture as illustrated by the broad acceptance of the Weinberger-Powell Doctrine.;The Bush Doctrine can he defined as an approach to U.S. foreign policy that is a form of militant idealism or neo -- idealism based on the concept of unrivalled military power and U.S. exceptionalism, supported by two principles; pre-emption and democratization. Pre-emption holds that the U.S. may institute regime change in any state that it deems a threat even if that threat is not imminent. Second, that the U.S. has the responsibility to foster the spread of democracy and free market economic systems.