| What makes one scientific explanation better than another? I argue that the most widely recognized criteria of the best explanation---unification, causation, simplicity, consilience, and conservatism---are best understood as consequences of scientific explanation's status as a social practice . Schematically, the best explanation is one in which a set of scientists satisfactorily replies to the objections raised by other scientists. I characterize these objections in terms of six types of speech-acts, which are then explicated in terms of the shared beliefs and empirical evidence available to inquirers. I support this position by arguing that the fallibility of scientific explanations entails that their justification depends upon the social standards of the scientific community.; To illustrate these ideas, I use three case studies in the history of science---the rise of the quark model in high-energy physics, the modern synthesis of natural selection and genetics in evolutionary biology, and the introduction of causal modeling techniques in sociological studies of occupational mobility. Additionally, these case studies help to illustrate how my account of explanation: (1) accommodates counterexamples that plague existing deductive and causal models of explanation, (2) provides plausible accounts of how seemingly pragmatic criteria of theory choice (e.g., simplicity, conservatism) are conducive to scientific objectivity, (3) defends explanatory coherentism against charges of its inadequacy as an account of epistemic justification, and (4) resolves tensions between social and philosophical accounts of science. |
