| This dissertation examines a prima facie conflict between two claims: first, that ordinary (or "folk") psychological states play causal roles in psychology in virtue of their contents; and second, that their contents are extrinsic properties. This conflict, sometimes called the problem of externalism, is one of the difficulties facing any complete account of mental causation. I argue that there is no a priori reason why "wide" contents (as they are often called) do not or cannot play causal roles in psychological explanations of behavior, and show how they might do so.; In typical psychological explanations, beliefs, desires and other mental states are cited as causes of behavior: Socrates remained in an Athenian jail because he believed that it was unjust to disobey the city's laws and he desired to act justly. If externalism is true, these contents---e.g. that it is unjust to disobey the city's laws---are individuated partly in terms of the nature of the agent's physical or social environment. It follows that if the environment is relevantly different, contents differ---even if there is no physical difference in the agent.; A variety of arguments try to show that externalism is not compatible with the causal role of content. I show how each argument fails to support its conclusion. I take one of Jerry Fodor's arguments as the most difficult. Fodor argues that wide contents violate the principle that mental properties must supervene on, or be identical to, neural properties if mental causation is to be made "intelligible". I show that his argument rests on the assumption that these neural properties are intrinsic, and argue that this "intrinsic hypothesis" is unjustified based on evidence from quantum chemistry and neuroscience. I also argue that at least some of the neural properties that play causal roles in computational theories of mind may be extrinsic. If so, then "wide" contents can be identified with or supervene on these properties, and they would satisfy Fodor's principle. I conclude by showing how this solution to the problem of externalism meshes with a general account of mental causation recently defended by Derk Pereboom. |
