Relativity, inversion and color in analytic philosophy

The first part of this dissertation concerns perceptual relativity, the familiar circumstance in which the appearances (colors, shapes, etc.) of things vary across a number of perceptual situations. I argue that perceptual relativity can be used to ground three claims: the distinction between appearances and what they are appearances of implies an ontological distinction; appearances so understood are routinely used by us in perception, both to ground perceptual claims, and at times as the object of perception; and both appearances and what they are appearances of are rightly regarded as colors (shapes, etc.). This view entails, among other things, that ontological constituents different from perceived things and their properties typically provide at least partial justification for perceptual claims, a view which agrees with the core of Bertrand Russell's often criticized sense-datum theory of perception. This view also entails that individual color terms have two legitimate and ontologically distinct referents, color appearances, and what those appearances are appearances of. Both constituents of our ontology are appropriately regarded as colors. The views of David Armstrong, Christopher Peacocke, David Rosenthal, Alex Byrne, and David Hilbert are discussed in detail.;The second part of this dissertation concerns the inverted qualia scenario, the hypothesis that two perceivers may have different color (or taste, etc.) experiences when viewing the same thing under the same conditions. This scenario, I argue, is best viewed as a challenge for what Michael Dummett takes to be a core pillar of analytic philosophy, the claim that all propositions are determinately expressible by a public language. My formulation of the inverted qualia scenario sidesteps charges of incoherence stemming from Intentionalism, charges perhaps most famously defended by Gilbert Harman. I consider two attempts to overcome the challenge the inverted dualia scenario poses for the expressibility of public language. The first was developed in detail by Sydney Shoemaker and is now considered implausible by most. The second solution is C. L. Hardin's and is drawn from current data concerning the prevalence of color category discriminations in perceivers. I argue that the interpretation of that data needed to sustain Hardin's argument is unjustified and conclude that we cannot endorse this pillar Dummett places at the heart of analytic philosophy.