Innovation and Philosophical Denial

Through ten chapters, this thesis explores and develops fundamental philosophical questions about the role of philosophy in innovation. In so doing, we examine what is taken to be a growing absence of philosophy, and then move towards identifying a potentially useful direction for revitalizing and enhancing philosophical inquiry and thought. All of this takes place against the backdrop of situating innovation in the broader context of the work of philosophy. The primary claim underpinning this thesis is that understanding more of each in the context of the other simultaneously enhances both.;The first part of this thesis provides a very brief high-level overview of two examples of innovation and the above-mentioned "forward march" that can be characterized as being reasonably complex, and, for the most part, has lived on what most would agree is (or was, during earlier times) "technology's leading edge". These examples are briefly reviewed from the perspective of the types of developments that took place to achieve them (or, at least, bring them close to fruition). In reviewing these examples, we make the observation that we find little if any explicit consideration of philosophy, or of reflective philosophical thought — and then a question: why would it be that we find the work of philosophy in our achievements (or in our attempts to reach substantial organizational, scientific, engineering, and political goals) either entirely absent or almost imperceptible?;This sets the stage for the core of this thesis: namely, an exploration of why explicit consideration of philosophical questions — having to do with rigorous thinking about presuppositions, for example — appears entirely absent from so much of our contemporary enterprise, and, especially, from so much of what we appear to aim to accomplish with what we think of as innovation.;As this core is first developed, a speculative question appears: what might have happened if either the approaches to or the steps taken in that development had included philosophical considerations and explicit philosophical thought?;Mid-portions of the thesis that follow move to a somewhat finer level of detail. This takes place in later chapters that provide overviews of two more examples of innovation environments, projects and processes in the realm of leading-edge science. They are based on the author's many years of work in both inventing and shaping, and also extensively managing two projects described. Although eyewitness testimony is often subject to serious question (Loftus 1974; Tversky and Kahneman 1977), it can nonetheless have a very strong influence on juries, for example, and if carried out rigorously to avoid errors of misinterpretation, can aid in filling out and adding value to what is generally thought to be the acquisition of a reliable and comprehensive picture. In this sense, the experiential examples are meant to add value to this thesis through the critical descriptive and interpretive methodology applied in any case study (Yin 2009) and especially based on the procedures of synthesis and interpretation of "thick description" (Geertz 1973).;A connection is made between the parts of the thesis that are based on these examples in the following way: the two personal work-based examples in the second section are specific to the general case that is provided in the first. They thereby add to the illustrative power of the range of examples provided here. In this way, the absence of philosophical considerations or philosophical thought in these examples is further revealed. Additional reflection regarding the challenge of this absence, or, if you prefer, the puzzlement of-why this might be so — is offered.;The thesis then moves into the realm of complex adaptive learning systems, the conceptual home to all the examples provided (as well as those that are included later in the document to emphasize the point).;In the chapters that follow, further examples of absence and therefore denial of philosophy are provided, including work and thinking in the fields of quantum mechanics and the holonic enterprise. How innovation and organizational policy are understood also adds to our understanding of the emergence of this denial. This leads to consideration of the reasons for denial of evidence and reason in the working of religious faith. Faith in reason and non-reason is examined.;The final part of this thesis suggests that the denial of philosophy may be a plausible indicator of slippage into non-reason, where the hard conceptual work of rigorous philosophical consideration is regarded as not only unnecessary but even threatening or just plain unknowable. Philosophical work is thereby removed from consideration. Having developed a foundation for the final argument that the denial and loss of the work of philosophy is not desirable because it limits reason, the thesis concludes by suggesting that philosophical awareness and work must be revitalized to eliminate or at least minimize denial. (Abstract shortened by UMI.).