Weaker states, risk-taking, and foreign policy: Rethinking North Korea's nuclear policy, 1989--2005

Starting with the question of why weaker nations challenge stronger nations, this dissertation offers an answer that combines prospect theory and two-level games with the case of the North Korean nuclear crisis. The conventional wisdom posits that weaker nations are less likely to challenge stronger nations because no nation wants to start a losing war. However, there have been many cases in which the weaker has challenged the stronger, and the weaker furthermore has shown dynamic policy changes between confrontation and cooperation. This study addresses this issue by focusing on the concept of risk and offers an explanation of how risk influences a weaker nation's foreign policy.; This study develops three hypotheses to understand Pyongyang's behavior: (1) status-quo bias, (2) preference reversal under catastrophic situation, and (3) domestic loss aversion. The first hypothesis means that if Pyongyang perceives the status quo to be deteriorating, it frames its external situation in the domain of losses, is more likely to become risk-acceptant, and chooses a more risky nuclear policy in an attempt to restore the status quo. The second hypothesis implies that if North Korea perceives military confrontation to be imminent, it will be more likely to be risk-averse in the domain of extreme losses and thus pursue a less risky nuclear policy to avoid the catastrophic outcome of war, that is, the collapse of the regime. The third hypothesis means that if North Korea perceives the domestic situation to have deteriorated to the point of threatening the regime's survival, it may become externally risk-acceptant and choose a risky nuclear policy to restore the domestic status quo. This implies that if the regime's domestic control becomes unsustainable, its domestic situation is more likely to determine its policy decision. However, if its domestic control is still strong enough to manage domestic challenges, its international situation is more likely to determine its policy.; Testing these hypotheses, this study explains Pyongyang's changing nuclear policies after the Cold War. Pyongyang has shown risk-acceptant or risk-averse attitudes according to its perceptions of internal and external situations. Thus, issues of risk are central to an understanding of Pyongyang's decision-making, and this study explains Pyongyang's changing nuclear policies between confrontation and cooperation.