| In twenty-nine states and the federal court system, a convicted felon can practice law but cannot serve on a jury. In those jurisdictions, a felonious bar applicant undergoes an individualized screening as part of the professional licensing procedure. Yet, in those same jurisdictions, convicted felons are categorically barred from jury service.;There are generally two proffered justifications for banning convicted felons from jury service: 1) lack of character and 2) an inherent bias. These justifications seemingly presume that convicted felons are static and uniformly threatening to the jury process. Yet, most jurisdictions that exclude convicted felons from jury service also permit convicted felons to practice law, ostensibly undermining any claim that convicted felons' character or biases make them permanently unsuitable to perform crucial legal roles.;In this thesis, I argue that lawyers and jurors are equally vital to the justice process. I then contend that research contradicts views of character and/or biases that are static and unchanging. Rather, studies show that character and bias evolve and are situational. Thus, evidence suggests that a more tailored process for assessing the competency of jurors– - like the individual assessments used to screen felonious bar applicants – is normatively superior to the categorical statutes at work in most jurisdictions. Individualized assessments also have the added benefit of promoting the principles of procedural justice; principals that have been linked to legal compliance and may facilitate convicted felons' successful reintegration. |
