A dragon on defense: China's strategic culture and war

Whether China's strategic culture is offensive or defensive in nature is an interesting question for understanding Chinese foreign policy behavior. Alastair Johnston argues for a strategic culture of offensive realism that leads to a pattern of Chinese aggressive behavior. But China's behavior in the Korean War (1950--53), the Sino-Indian War (1962), and the Sino-Vietnam War (1979) shows a defensive pattern that Johnston's analysis cannot fully explain. This project will apply both qualitative and quantitative research methods to test Johnston's conclusion. Through qualitative historical case studies (the Korean War, Sino-Indian War, and Sino-Vietnam war), this dissertation identifies the strategic context in which China's war decisions were made. By using quantitative operational code analysis, this research tests the variation and continuity of the belief systems of the Chinese foreign policy leaders (Mao Zedong, Zhou Enlai, Deng Xiaoping, etc.) during peace and war. Comparing the results of these two methods, this dissertation looks at the congruence of beliefs with their behaviors and tests my main hypothesis, which is that China's decisions are congruent with a defensive strategic culture. Despite the variations in the belief systems of different leaders, they predominantly display operational code beliefs that reflect the culture of defensive realism regarding foreign policy behavior. Depending on the particular leaders, the results either qualify or reverse Johnston's cultural realist argument. The results of the research also shed light on the question of what kind of great power China will become, thus providing policy implications for decision makers of other countries. The analysis may help in making valid predictions of Chinese policies toward settling the Taiwan Strait tension and the South China Sea issue.