| This thesis is concerned with Corporate Reorganization under the Companies' Creditors Arrangement Act (R.S.C. 1985, c. C-36; the "Act"). While empirical studies fail to show conclusive results, it is argued in this paper that reorganizations under the Act may have resulted in the demise of private governance mechanisms and the subsequent increase in interest rates and monitoring costs; that management has a strong incentive to turn to reorganization in order to preserve their jobs; that the employees of the firm are not necessarily better off under the Act's regime, and concludes with stating that the creditors' consent to the plan, does not in itself justify the procedure that is deemed inefficient. Thus, this paper suggests that the free market, as a catalyst to restructure, would serve as a better solution to the problem of troubled firms and calls for the decreased use of the Act, as well as for a more narrow, rigid and self restrained interpretive approach towards the Act. |
