| The relationship with the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia has traditionally represented a major pillar of the U.S. strategy in the Middle East. As this relationship was still reeling from the impact of the September 11, 2001 attacks against the U.S, where Saudi terrorists were disproportionately involved, the U.S. invasion of Iraq posed another challenge for it. This thesis examines how the war on Iraq and the attendant developments have informed Washington's partnership with Riyadh. It first shows that although earlier disagreements over the rise of the Shiite parties to pre-eminence in Iraq pulled Washington and Riyadh apart, they proved unable to permanently rupture the U.S-Saudi partnership. Next, this study demonstrates that while the wave of terrorism which engulfed post-invasion Iraq strained U.S-Saudi ties, it also opened new grounds for cooperation between Washington and Riyadh. Third, this thesis shows that the pro-democracy impulse which, to no small measure, informed the U.S. involvement in Iraq did little lasting damage to U.S-Saudi ties as more familiar geostrategic interests gradually eclipsed the need for genuine reforms in Riyadh. Finally, this research demonstrates that the U.S-Saudi defense partnership is still potent. In the final analysis, the 2003 invasion of Iraq created a new array of circumstances that invite closer U.S-Saudi cooperation. |
