| This thesis examines Article XIX of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, the "safeguard" provision, which allows states that experience an unexpected disruption or downturn in a domestic industry, caused by increased imports resulting from GATT trade concessions, to temporarily suspend, on a non-discriminatory basis, the GATT obligations that caused the disruption. Alan O. Sykes, based on his application of public choice theory to the behaviour of the signatory states, has argued that the safeguard provision is a necessary component of the GATT, since without it states would have lacked the incentives to enter into the GATT, and the present agreement would unravel. By contrast, I analyze rationales for the safeguard regime from a 'two-level game' perspective, incorporating international as well as domestic incentives. I conclude that states will comply with a more restrictive safeguard regime than that advocated by Sykes, and propose reforms to the current regime accordingly. |
