| Islamic clerics have both supported and undermined regimes in the Middle East. Egyptian clerics, in the 1980s and 1990s, discredited Islamic extremists intent on overthrowing the government. In contrast, Iran's ayatollahs helped depose the Shah in 1979.; The disparity in clerical behavior raises the question: What determines the likelihood of cooperation or conflict between Islamic clerics and Middle Eastern regimes? The dominant hypothesis suggests that clerical support for the regime derives from the doctrine of political authority endorsed by its sect. With regard to the two countries forming the basis of this study, such a hypothesis predicts passivity from Egypt's Sunni clerics who maintain that tyranny is preferable to civil strife, and defiance from Iran's Shi'i clerics who proclaim worldly government to be illegitimate.; Yet, the historical record of both countries includes numerous examples that contradict the doctrinal thesis. Egypt's Sunni clerics at times led protests against the regime and Iran's history includes long periods of regime-clerical cooperation. My research demonstrates that patterns of conflict and cooperation are not determined by the clerics' ideological disposition, but rather, by the interaction between the clerics and the regime as each pursues their independent interests.; Three considerations strongly influence the strategy selection of regimes and the clerics: (1) the agenda of the opposition; (2) the level of popular opposition; and (3) the clerics' responsiveness to public opinion. My research demonstrates that conflict between clerics and regimes is rare because the factors promoting clerical opposition to the regime are the same factors that increase the regime's need to draw on clerical support. For the clerics, an increase in the level of popular opposition enhances the potential benefits of opposition to the regime. Yet, this shift also intensifies the utility of public support to the regime, and thus raises the value of the clergy's endorsement. Upon provision of a side-payment, clerics do not defect. In sum, my dissertation explains when regime-clerical conflict occurs, when clerics posses the greatest influence over the regime, and when the clerical establishment is likely to splinter. |
