| Liberal political theory identifies private property rights as the necessary condition of liberty under republican national government. Laissez-faire extends this to deny society's right to interfere with private economic behavior. Marxism asserts the privileged position of the proletariat to govern through collective property ownership. Subsequent history has discredited Marxism, while laissez-faire ideology drives a global economy, dominated by transnational corporations, that challenges liberal assumptions of republican democracy. This conflict results from the incomplete application of liberal theory to the structure of corporate ownership. The thesis proposes a means to make corporate ownership consistent with democratic theory by applying the liberal principle “one shareholder, one vote” to elected boards of directors. It is argued that structured representation of (1) upper management, (2) domestic and foreign labor, (3) domestic and foreign communities, (4) institutional investors, and (5) individual shareholders is justified by the property rights adhering to stock ownership. |
