| This dissertation hypothesizes that members of Congress vote to redistribute wealth to their constituents rather than to enhance economic efficiency. To test this hypothesis, I examine four congressional votes related to the Uruguay Round trade agreements including votes on whether to extend "fast track" negotiating authority in 1991 and again in 1993, the vote on the Uruguay Round trade agreements (1994) and the vote on granting permanent normal trade relations to China to pave the way for its accession into the WTO (2000). I find that members of Congress responded to campaign contributions, such that labor union contributions increased the likelihood of a vote for protectionism and industry contributions increased likelihood of a vote for trade liberalization. Other variables corresponding to labor and capital interests had little to no influence on congressional voting. I also discuss the influence of the executive branch on congressional voting. I found that the president exerted a strong influence on congressional voting through strategic lobbying. This was especially true for those votes that were more controversial in nature. Finally, I address the manner in which the WTO, and trade agreements in general, have changed the relationship between interest groups and legislators with regard to trade policy by analyzing two cases brought before the WTO's Dispute Settlement Panel---the Kodak-Fuji dispute and the reformulated gasoline dispute. |
