Econometrically calibrated computable general equilibrium models: Applications to the analysis of energy and climate politics

Economy-energy-environment models are the mainstay of economic assessments of policies to reduce carbon dioxide (CO2) emissions, yet their empirical basis is often criticized as being weak. This thesis addresses these limitations by constructing econometrically calibrated models in two policy areas.;The first is a 35-sector computable general equilibrium (CGE) model of the U.S. economy which analyzes the uncertain impacts of CO2 emission abatement. Econometric modeling of sectors' nested constant elasticity of substitution (CES) cost functions based on a 45-year price-quantity dataset yields estimates of capital-labor-energy-material input substitution elasticities and biases of technical change that are incorporated into the CGE model. I use the estimated standard errors and variance-covariance matrices to construct the joint distribution of the parameters of the economy's supply side, which I sample to perform Monte Carlo baseline and counterfactual runs of the model. The resulting probabilistic abatement cost estimates highlight the importance of the uncertainty in baseline emissions growth.;The second model is an equilibrium simulation of the market for new vehicles which I use to assess the response of vehicle prices, sales and mileage to CO2 taxes and increased corporate average fuel economy (CAFE) standards. I specify an econometric model of a representative consumer's vehicle preferences using a nested CES expenditure function which incorporates mileage and other characteristics in addition to prices, and develop a novel calibration algorithm to link this structure to vehicle model supplies by manufacturers engaged in Bertrand competition. CO2 taxes' effects on gasoline prices reduce vehicle sales and manufacturers' profits if vehicles' mileage is fixed, but these losses shrink once mileage can be adjusted. Accelerated CAFE standards induce manufacturers to pay fines for noncompliance rather than incur the higher costs of radical mileage improvements. Neither policy induces major increases in fuel economy.