| The dissertation explores the historical development of the Yogācāra doctrine of self-cognition. The concept “self-cognition (svasam&dotbelow;vedana )” refers to the reflexive nature of the human mind, which is also a main subject in modern psychology and the rapidly-growing field of cognitive science. My central thesis is that the Buddhist doctrine of self-cognition originated in a soteriological discussion of omniscience among the Mahāsām&dotbelow;ghikas, an early Buddhist school established right after the first schism of Buddhist community. The doctrine then evolved into a topic of epistemological inquiry among the Yogācārins.; Based on the primary sources in Chinese, Pāli, Sanskrit and Tibetan, I trace the origin of the doctrine of self-cognition back to the Mahāsām&dotbelow;ghikas. In their discussion on the omniscience of Srota-āpanna, an initial stage of Buddhist sagehood, they admit that this omniscience and, consequently, the self-cognition of the mind and mental activities occur in a single moment. In their view, the mind is like a lamp: it illuminates other things while it also illuminates itself.; The dissertation then explores the subsequent development of this doctrine in a series of Buddhist scholars, including Sarvāstivādins, Sautrāntikas, and Yogācārins. The Sarvāstivādins set forth a systematic refutation to the Mahāsām&dotbelow;ghika doctrine in terms of causality, epistemology, soteriology, the relationship of self and other, the distinction between particular and universal, and supportive similes. The Sarvāstivādins also developed a reflective model, in which they saw self-cognition as possible only in multiple moments rather than in a single moment.; The Sautrāntikas developed their doctrine of self-cognition by synthesizing the views of their predecessors. They discussed self-cognition in a more epistemological context, and especially in a framework of successively arising moments of cognition. They conclude that only mental consciousness is endowed with the capacity of self-cognition.; The early Yogācāra doctrine of self-cognition bears a strong mark of Sautrāntika influence, although it was modified by contact with the Yogācāra idealism. Dignāga was the first Yogācāra scholar to systematize a doctrine of self-cognition in his epistemological system. I argue, against several eminent contemporary scholars, that self-cognition is a separate type of perception for Dignāga. Finally, I introduce Dharmapāla's concept of the cognition of self-cognition, which signifies a further level of reflexivity of the mind. |
