The Making of the Presidency in Revolutionary Spanish America Executive Power and State Formation in Argentina, Mexico and Venezuela, 1810-1826

This dissertation examines the making of the presidency in nineteenth century Latin America by linking it to the processes of early national state formation. The aim is to offer a systematic and historical analysis that can explain the creation of presidential government in revolutionary Spanish America. It has a comparative historical focus with three cases: Mexico, Venezuela and Argentina. The period under analysis spans from independence from the Spanish Empire in 1810 to the mid 1820s, when all these countries had adopted presidentialism for the first time. The thesis that I propose is that the creation of presidentialism can be explained by the early nineteenth century constitution makers' intention to create legitimate centralized political authority, namely an authority compatible with popular sovereignty, constitutionalism and liberalism in the context of post-revolutionary and post-colonial state formation. I argue that presidentialism was adopted against other choices because constitution makers regarded it as the most suitable institution for the needs of national state formation and liberal legitimation. I use an analytical framework that involves three contexts that facilitate the presidential outcome: revolutionary politics, state building and the fear of federalism and international relations.