The philosophical implications of zoophilia: A response to Peter Singer and his critics

The Canadian Criminal Code currently prohibits any contact with a non-human animal for the purpose of human sexual gratification. This prohibition dates back unbroken to the creation of a Canadian jurisdiction, and was in existence under British law prior to that. Peter Singer has recently asked whether zoophilia is always worthy of legal sanction and moral condemnation. More specifically: Singer wonders whether instances of zoophilic contact that cause no apparent harm to participants can rightly be considered liable to such sanction or condemnation. Critics of Singer's stance most frequently cite the supposed inability of a nonhuman animal to render genuine consent to zoophilic contacts as sufficient grounds to make zoophilia morally problematic without exception. If one takes non-human consent seriously, however, then one cannot avoid making human interventions into the lives of non-human animals almost universally problematic. Zoophilia is prohibited, despite the fact that no similar legal restrictions have ever been (or are, or are likely ever to be) levied against the wide variety of far more overt harms to which non-human animals are routinely subjected in human industries---both agricultural and scientific---harms to which no non-human animal is even presumed to have given consent. This examination suggests a different approach to determining the proper moral and legal status of zoophilic activities by regarding any such interactions within the moral and legal contexts of fiduciary relationships. Under such a scheme, the only permissible human interventions into the lives of non-human animals would be those aimed at promoting the best interests of the weaker (i.e., non-human) party and, therefore, obligated by fiduciary duty.