Kant's aesthetic imperatives: Sources of normativity in the 'Critique of Judgment'

The problem of this thesis is how to interpret Kant's views about the universality and necessity of the judgment of taste. My conclusions are, first, that the universality and necessity of taste should be understood as normative claims implicit in these judgments, which tell us that we "ought" to do certain things. Because of their normative, imperatival nature, I term these claims "aesthetic imperatives." On my reading, there are two such imperatives. The first is the demand to take pleasure in a given object (the "Pleasure-Imperative"), while the second is the demand to attend to that object (the "Attention-Imperative").;Second, I conclude that, if we understand the universality and necessity of taste as implicit aesthetic imperatives, then Kant's ascription of these qualities to the judgment of taste is defensible. In defense of this conclusion, I offer reconstructions of Kant's explanations of the sources of the normativity of taste. On my reading, the two distinct imperatives contained in the judgment of taste also have distinct sources. The Pleasure Imperative is linked to Kant's notion of the "Harmony of the Faculties in Free Play." As I interpret it, the latter notion can only be understood as a source of normativity if we link it to Kant's concept of an "Aesthetic Standard Idea." The Attention-Imperative, on the other hand, is rooted in a connection that Kant sees between beauty and morality. For Kant, both natural beauty and fine art are linked (in different ways) with the ultimate moral aim of humankind, the realization of the Highest Good.