Artificial life: Life form, simulation, or simulacrum

This thesis addresses the philosophical implications of the emerging science called artificial life (or A-Life). It examines aspects of the role artificial life programming will play in the future of the philosophy of biology, the philosophy of science, the philosophy of technology, the philosophy of computer science and cognitive science. In addition, some key claims made by artificial life researchers, regarding the ability to create living organisms in the medium of the computer are critically examined.;We find that while A-Life projects do fit some of the traditional definitions for living systems, we are still able to cast doubt on the claim that all forms of A-Life can be said to be examples of living things. Specifically we find that A-Life systems that are entirely resident within a computer, such as those based on cellular automata, are particularly vulnerable to criticism. We find that the study of A-Life can be seen as one of the first postmodern sciences in that it is a science that is concerned more with the computational media used to study the phenomena of life, than with actual biological instances of life. The understanding that A-Life studies a simulacrum of life and not life itself is crucial to correctly interpreting the results and findings of this new field of study.