| In order to fully address the experience of suffering and evil, one must distinguish and appropriately address qualitative differences in those experiences. Failure to do so vitiates the ability to make good moral judgments and makes it impossible to address different kinds of evil. To address these differences, I use a creative synthesis of process and narrative theologies. This synthesis is useful because while narrative can present the experience of suffering and evil, it cannot analyze it. At the same time, while process can analyze evil, it cannot engage or transform it, something narrative does through reconfiguration.; I describe four distinct experiences of evil. The first is the tragic, which describes the experience of suffering as an inevitable part of life. The second is the demonic, which is the experience of evil as something that precedes an individual but for which that individual is still in some way responsible. The third experience is radical evil, which describes situations in which there is no hope or creativity, something a traditional Christian approach sees as impossible. It is, however, possible to be so trapped in a distorting narrative that one cannot see alternatives to destructive action. Because consciousness is partially constitutive of reality, if one cannot see hope or creative possibility, none exists. The experience of radical evil points to a God who gives hope in the midst of hopelessness, creating something new despite the complete absence of creativity.; The final experience is radical suffering, which is suffering that leaves one mute. It is uncommunicated and cannot be incorporated into a personal narrative. Because persons are formed by their narrative, this destroys the coherence of the self and robs meaning from a entire life. Once suffering is communicated, it is no longer radical. One cannot bring meaning to the radical suffering of others, however. In this situation, all that can be done is to bear witness to the story, allowing oneself to be transformed by it. |
