Knowledge and norms: A defense of epistemic justification

In this dissertation, I defend the thesis that epistemic justification is necessary for knowledge and also provide a deontological theory about the nature of epistemic justification. To hone my own deontological account of epistemic justification, I look at various examples and arguments designed to show that one can have knowledge even if one has violated certain epistemic norms or duties. Particularly, I examine some prominent examples from William Alston and Alvin Plantinga. I conclude that these counterexamples do not show that justification deontologically construed is necessary for knowledge. Nevertheless, these counterexamples are helpful in constructing the following plausible partial theory of epistemic justification: A belief B is epistemically justified for a person S only if (a) S's acquiring or maintaining B did not violate any pertinent ultima facie epistemic duty and (b) S did not violate any pertinent prima facie epistemic duty (that is not overridden) in arriving at or maintaining B. While such an account avoids certain counterexamples, the normativity involved seems suspect from the "naturalist" perspective so prevalent in contemporary epistemology. As a result, I try to identify what types of naturalized epistemology might conflict with my account. Interestingly enough, it turns out that my account is compatible with a variety of naturalist approaches. And I contend that those naturalistic theories that are inimical to my approach provide inadequate accounts of epistemic norms.;My concluding inquiries concern the nature of these epistemic norms or duties. Contrary to the received view, I argue that it is reasonable to view these as types of moral or ethical duties. In other words, I maintain that epistemic normativity is not sui generis. To support my position, I first defuse some of the common arguments that allegedly show that epistemic justification is distinct from moral justification. Next I argue that a close examination of the "social aspects" of knowledge reveals that ethical considerations are relevant to certain cases of knowledge and I contend that epistemic norms possess at least some of the same characteristics (such as overridingness) as moral norms.