| Although the assumption has always been that, compared to diplomacy or open military intervention, covert action is a quick, easy, and comparatively cheap way to accomplish certain foreign policy goals, in fact past covert operations have incurred significant financial, security, and reputational costs. The question this dissertation seeks to answer is why, despite the risks of increasing instability and mistrust of the United States, presidents decide to overthrow foreign governments? Using a structured, focused comparison of cases involving decisions both to use and not to use covert action from Eisenhower (Indonesia, Cuba, and Egypt) and Kennedy (Cuba, British Guiana, and Laos), this study identifies the different causal mechanisms that can lead to a decision to use covert action.; Decisions not to use covert action differed from the use cases in two key respects: first, policymakers conducted a thorough analysis of the available options and, second, and more importantly, the president was involved in the decision process. The decisions in the four use cases all involved the activation of schemas, which, in effect, overrode the normal process of policy evaluation. Thus, the non-use cases conformed to the rational choice interpretation of decision making, while the use cases showed the importance of individual differences. The cases also showed that the most important factor determining presidential involvement in the decisions was the degree of perceived risk; i.e., where there was a stronger chance of covert action leading to a confrontation with the Soviets, presidents were more involved and called for a more thorough analysis of policy options. The study found no support for the democratic peace hypothesis, or for the “CIA as rogue elephant” or the economic interests explanations of covert action. |
