| This thesis seeks to probe deeper into possible criteria for allocating jurisdiction over environmental policy in a free trade context. The investigation proceeds by examining first recent moves within the European Community to adjust environmental policy to the principle of subsidiarity. The analysis then adopts a comparative approach and discusses various issues for Canadian environmental policy arising from the Canadian division of powers. The Canadian division of powers is shown to operate with much more narrow principles and rules than under the EC-Treaty with the resultant overlap in concurrent policy-making necessitating various forms and techniques for policy-coordination. A final part of the inquiry engages economic theories of federalism, in particular recent prescriptions for greater decentralization of environmental policy that have informed the debate on subsidiarity. These theories are shown to be deficient in furnishing an adequate account of why individuals would accept regulatory competition without assurances as to a guaranteed minimum of environmental quality irrespective of a particular level of material wealth. The study, therefore, concludes that on a redistributive understanding of environmental policy, central agents, corresponding in their territorial span to the geographical reach of 'markets' have an important role to play. |
