Insuring the future: The development and diffusion of systems management in the American and European space program

The primary argument of this thesis is that, empowered by Cold War imperatives, scientists and engineers developed technical methods to create complex weapons technologies, which managers and military officers then appropriated and modified to control R&D and its scientists and engineers. This study narrates and compares the development of organizational structures and processes in the United States Air Force (USAF), the National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA), and the integrated European Space programs, including the European Space Vehicle Launcher Development Organisation (ELDO), the European Space Research Organisation (ESRO), and the European Space Agency (ESA).;To counter Soviet efforts, Air Force officers led by Bernard Schriever promoted Intercontinental Ballistic Missiles (ICBMs). Schriever imported new methods taken from managers, scientists and engineers into a novel Air Force organization separated from the rest of the USAF bureaucracy. Inside this organization scientists and engineers developed new organizational methods to develop ICBMs. As technical problems emerged and costs dramatically rose, conservative managers and engineers eventually gained control over Schriever's organization, by using and modifying some of the new processes.;Similar events occurred at the Jet Propulsion Laboratory (JPL) and in NASA's manned space programs. In both of these organizations, scientists and engineers led in the development of new space technologies, but ran into technical and cost problems. Both created technical means to enhance technical reliability. However, NASA Headquarters imposed its control over the programs by the mid-1960s. At JPL, Congressional investigations of technical problems led to headquarters control. In the manned programs, NASA Headquarters imported a number of Air Force officers led by Samuel Phillips, who imposed configuration control over the manned programs.;The Europeans encountered similar problems. ELDO ultimately failed because its lack of authority to impose consistent communication and organization led to failed launches. ESRO succeeded, in part because it had more authority, and because it received substantial help from NASA. ESA built on the ESRO model, and received more help from NASA. Both ESRO and ESA adopted American-style systems management.