| The goals of China's merger control regime have been heatedly debated after the enactment of the Antimonopoly Law of the People's Republic of China (AML). In the center of the debate lies the question whether non-economic and non-competition goals are the reasons for the Chinese merger control regulator to prohibit or to restrict transactions greenlighted by merger control regulators of other jurisdictions.;Before an analysis can be conducted as to whether the AML should pursue non-economic or non-competition goals, it is necessary to explore what the goals of China's merger control regime are. What are the connotations of these goals? Are stated goals actually pursued in practice or only written in the law? And, is there any reason for the pursuit of particular goals? In the absence of proper answers to these questions, any comment on the goals can be a castle in the air and thus is flawed.;This thesis concentrates on a thorough exploration of the goals of China's merger control regime. It explores the legal framework of merger control established under China's AML, searches for the goals as reflected in the administrative provisions issued by the Chinese merger control regulator and analyzes what the decisions on merger control say with respect to the goals of merger control under the AML. On that basis, the goals of China's merger control regime are compared with the most influential competition theories developed in the West and then analyzed in connection with China's most influential economic theories. Having explained any possible connections between the goals of China's merger control regime and competition theories and the economic theories developed outside and inside China, this thesis offers a refined analysis of the goals of China's merger control regime, clarifies these goals' theoretical underpinnings, and explains the momentum for the pursuit of these goals under China's AML. |
