Controlling decentralization: The Party and local elites in post-Mao Jiangsu (China)

This research analyzes the impact of the decentralization of China's personnel system on the capacity of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) to maintain political control over local elite appointments and promotions. I show how Chinese decision-makers have devised effective institutional arrangements such that local CCP organs are mobilized to maintain a high degree of organizational cohesion among cadres, which in turn enhances the regime's capacity to sustain economic decentralization despite staggering variations in reform outcomes among localities.; Chapter 2 presents the formal structure of power of China's personnel management system. I show how the Center has effectively mitigated potentially undesirable political consequences of the deconcentration of the personnel system through a series institutional reforms of inter-local relations while proceeding in a direction and at a pace consistent with the goals of a risk-averse leadership.; Chapter 3 relies on a survey of elites in four counties of Jiangsu Province. The high degree of cohesion in cadre perceptions of the local personnel system speaks to the capacity of the CCP to instill and maintain formal norms among officials, operate in a fashion that is consistent with the rules defined at the center and remain a robust organization despite institutional, attitudinal and socio-economic cleavages among cadres.; Chapter 4 examines the correlates of promotions among respondents. I explicitly test whether Beijing's broad policy objectives have been met in practice. Empirical results indicate that the career profiles of these county officials are consistent with the hypothesis that the decentralization of personnel management has not eroded the CCP's political control over county elites.; Chapter 5 takes the analysis of Party-cadre relations to the lowest level of China's local government, the villages. I focus on the party's capacity to co-opt elected village leaders as CCP secretaries. The recent experience among 682 villages of Gaoyou illustrates the difficulties of local CCP organizations to adapt to the changed institutional environment of more competitive village elections.; Chapter 6 presents the implications and limitations of these findings for our understanding of the Chinese political system.