Structuration of international contract labor migration: A comparative analysis of overseas migrant workers in South Korea and Mexican braceros in the United State

International labor migration has been an essential feature of economic development. In many ways, migrants are induced by both economic and non-pecuniary opportunities of labor receiving countries, but such migration flows and the attendant socialization process are mediated by political decisions. This dissertation examines how transnational contract workers become incorporated in the labor process of South Korea's industrial economy and the U.S.' agricultural sector. South Korea began importing foreign labor in 1991 from labor surplus countries of Southeast Asia, China, and the Philippines. Euphemistically called the Industrial Technical Trainee System, the South Korean Government allowed private manpower agencies to recruit and place foreign workers on contracts. The increasing demand for labor in small and mid-sized manufacturing firms greatly expanded recruitment efforts, importing labor from over twenty countries. Similarly, U.S. agribusiness continuously vied for cheap source of labor principally from Mexico beginning in the early 1900s. Due to a sharp decline in agricultural labor pool during WWII, a bilateral agreement was reached between the governments of the U.S. and Mexico in 1942 to allow the placement of Mexican workers in U.S. agriculture. Started ostensibly to meet labor demand during the 'war-time emergency' period, the so-called bracero program outlasted the war for nearly twenty-two years.;In understanding the complex of institutions and actors involved in 'structuring' contract labor migration, this dissertation analyzes the role of state in providing conditions for capital accumulation by importing foreign workers. Defined as rules and resources, the structure of international labor migration systems of South Korea and the U.S. revealed a myriad of institutions constituted by strategically situated actors who perpetuated the structure of domination. One of the principal aspects of such domination involved state-business alliance that not only manifested in stratified labor structure along national and racial lines, but also served to discipline both domestic and foreign workers. But, as articulated by Anthony Giddens, rules and resources have both constraining and enabling characteristics. As such, the very foundation of domination served as a departure point for worker agency. In short, this thesis examines the interplay between structure of domination and individual agency in structuring international contract labor migration.