BEHAVIORISM AND NORMATIVITY: THE PROSPECT OF A SKINNERIAN PSYCHOLOGISM (WATSON, HUSSERL, CARNAP, SKINNER)

The thesis attempts to formulate a behavioristc definition of normativity based on proposals by B. F. Skinner in the context of a general analysis of the problem of reconciling psychology with normative science, especially logic. An introduction states the problem and briefly traces its historical roots. Chapter 1 traces modern acceptance of the view that psychology is irrelevant to normative science to Husserl's and Frege's victorious arguments against nineteenth century psychologism, and aims to show them inconclusive against modern psychologies through an in-depth analysis of them, particularly Husserl's arguments. Chapter 2 develops a definition of behaviorism through a historical analysis of J. B. Watson's writings of 1913 and, more briefly, B. F. Skinner's relation to operationism and logical positivism. Chapter 3 extracts a definition of natural rationality from Skinner's conception of operant behavior through an analogy with Carnap's theory of two probabilities. Chapter 4 develops a cultural rationality condition from Skinner's theories of problem solving, rules, and behavioral and cultural evolution. Chapter 5 contains a review and conclusions. Five appendices cover incidental topics from the first two chapters: the problem of privacy in the arguments against psychologism, accusations against behavioristic ideology, Watson's role in the emergence of behaviorism, Bergmann's Watson, and the "image-type" controversy of 1913.