The institutional sources of military doctrine: The United States in Vietnam and Britain in the Boer War and Malaya

This thesis offers an institutional model of the forces shaping military doctrine. It compares the successful adaptation of the British to the threat posed by the Boers in South Africa with the unsuccessful adaptation of the United States to the threat posed by the Vietnamese communists to find predominant analyses of military doctrine (particularly Barry Posen, 1984) inadequate. The institutional model developed in the thesis is based on the broader literature concerning the delegation of power in organizations. It examines civil military relations as one of a variety of relationships involving the delegation of power. The logic of delegated power depends as much on the institutional structure governing the superior (the civilian authorities) as the specialized subordinate (the military organizations). This model proposes that the differences in adaptability demonstrated by British and American military organizations in response to similar threats can be explained by the distinct structure of civilian institutions and their effect on the growth of military institutions.