| This study explores the relevance of regime-type characteristics for explaining Latin American policy processes by examining two cases of tax reform (1970 and 1978) in Venezuela. It also examines the importance of party control of government in the Venezuelan case. Finally, it addresses the question of whether the Venezuelan policy process and interest intermediation structure approaches a pluralist or a corporatist pattern.;The findings, which show that the policy-making process in Venezuela differs significantly from that found in authoritarian settings, lend support to the hypothesis that regime type is a relevant explanatory variable. Another finding of the study is that while party control of government does not make a difference in terms of the basic pattern of policy making, it does in terms of policy substance. Finally, it was found that none of the major traits associated with corporatist structures of interest intermediation has a significant presence in the Venezuelan context. As for policy-making patterns, however, the findings are that the pervasiveness of semi-institutionalized instances of interest group-government contacts outside the constitutional framework makes the Venezuelan case resemble the corporatist model. Yet this similarity was found to be neither the product of historic tradition nor the result of a conscious governmental attempt at forcefully shaping a system of interest representation that subordinates the civil society to its dictates. Instead, it was found to reflect the pressures brought about by the interest groups themselves in their attempts at penetrating and controlling the state apparatus. |
