Assessing the impact of corruption on the efficacy of counterproliferation efforts: The case of oil-for food and Iraq's sanctioned weapons program

The purpose of this thesis is to discuss the impact of corruption during the United Nations (UN) Oil-For-Food program during the 1990s and Iraq`s sanctioned weapons program ultimately leading up to the Iraqi campaign from 2003-2012. It seeks to expand literature on Explosive Ordnance Disposal operations and counterproliferation efforts by exploring the acts of corruption of the Iraqi regime as well as that of member states of the United Nations. This thesis covers the significant findings from the Independent Inquiry Committee Into the United Nations Oil-For-Food Programme and the linkages between Iraq`s illicit profits from the Oil-For-Food program and Iraq`s continued weapons development programs analyzed from the Comprehensive Report of the Special Advisor to the DCI on Iraq`s WMD. The thesis will address the significant historical developments surrounding the UN Security Council Resolutions and the imposed sanctions as a result of Iraq`s aggression against Kuwait and further refusal to cooperate with the respective UN weapons inspections that ultimately led to the implementation of the Oil For-Food program. The Oil-For-Food program allowed for significant corruption of the UN and the companies and industries within the key party states of the UN. Finally, this thesis will offer an analysis of the efficacy of UN economic sanctions as a means of deterrence in preventing countries from proliferating weapons and weapons programs. Coupled with the Volcker and Duelfer Reports, the thesis draws conclusions from primary source material including UN, United States General Accountability Office, Central Intelligence Agency, as well as US, United Kingdom, and Australian military reports, memorandums and notes from UN weapons inspectors. Secondary materials offer further insight and assist in explaining Saddam Hussein`s primary goals of eroding the UN sanctions and reconstituting Iraq`s sanctioned weapons programs. The thesis answers the question: How effective were UN sanctions in preventing the Iraqi regime from weapons development and acquisition? It answers the primary question by first identifying Saddam Hussein`s ongoing intent to re-establish Iraq as a major power player in the Middle East with his assumption that the only way to preserve Iraq`s integrity and sovereignty against Iran, Israel, and the United States was through securing offensive capabilities comparable to that of other major nation states. This thesis then highlights concerns and impacts on the EOD and counterproliferation community as a result of continuing efforts for weapons development and advancements. Finally, it provides recommendations, implications, and areas for future study.