The decline of the Franco-Yugoslav alliance, 1933-1937

Traditionally, diplomatic historians of the interwar period have emphasized Germany and its successes prior to 1941. This work examines the reverse side of this issue, focusing on the decline of French diplomacy in southeastern Europe, specifically in Yugoslavia.The Franco-Yugoslav alliance was forged following the Versailles settlements of 1919-1921. Abandoned by guarantors Britain and the United States, France cultivated Yugoslavia to serve as a guardian of the settlements in southeastern Europe. The two states were linked by a common fear of Germany. However, the alliance suffered from a number of weaknesses which became evident after the rise of Nazi Germany in the 1930s.France's view of Italy and the USSR as essential to its defense against Germany troubled French relations with Yugoslavia, which regarded those states rather than Germany as its principal adversaries. Yugoslavia's attitude, largely determined by the ruling Serbs' quarrel with the Croatian minority, thwarted French efforts to fashion a viable defense against Hitler in central Europe. Chronic economic insufficiencies, long a source of friction between the two states, were exacerbated by the political disagreements.These flaws were transformed into insurmountable obstacles by the Italo-Ethiopian crisis, which damaged France's credibility with its small allies and caused major upheavals in French domestic politics. The crisis and its aftermath convinced Yugoslav officials that France's day in Europe was done. Despite efforts by French diplomats to revive the alliance, Yugoslavia elected to sign a non-aggression pact with Italy in 1937, underscoring the decline of its alliance with France and the Versailles order and the beginning of a precarious neutrality before the Axis powers.The thesis offers new insights into the beginning of the Second World War. It illustrates the role of conflicts between national groups in the collapse of the French alliances in Europe. It describes the degree to which the fear of Communism influenced the policies of Yugoslavia and the other East European states in the last years before the war. It highlights the poor economic foundation of the French alliances in southeastern Europe. Finally, it suggests that the Italo-Ethiopian war, rather than the Rhineland invasion or Munich, was the determining factor in the eclipse of French diplomacy in Eastern Europe.