An Analysis Of Reform Policy Making Process From The Perspectiv Of Game Theory

For a modern society,normal development relies on a government to issue a series of public policies and provide public services.With the gradual development of the level of social relations of production,with the change of the times and the environment,the government needs to adopt a series of reforms to adapt to the current state of society.However,for any government department in the world,reform of existing public policy is often the most difficult.As reform policy is bound to involve a lot of strong vested interest groups,the implementation of the policy process is difficult to smooth sailing.Since the vested interest groups involved in the reform want to maximize their own interests and the nature of the reform policy involving public goods belongs to the redistribution of interests.Therefore,in the case where the overall interest does not change greatly,acute debates triggered by policy reform belong to the "zero-sum game."In this paper,we study the multi-party forces involved in the policy reform process in Taiwan and use game theory to establish an incomplete information game model.Through the analysis of the model,it is concluded that the Taiwan authorities and the opposition groups would take the action strategy to maximize the benefits in the promotion of the annuity reform policy,and find out that the strategies adopted by multi-interest groups in reality are in line with the analysis of the theoretical model,considerably verifying the model.Then,according to the theoretical analysis,it predicts further strategies that the Taiwan authorities may take.In addition,it further expands the theoretical model,applies it to broad implementation process in policy reform,and tries to draw a general conclusion.