Study On The Construction And Stability Of The Eco-Industrial Chain Of Industrial Park-From The Perspective Of The Game Theory

At present,Eco-industrial parks has become an important way to solve the contradiction between economic development,excessive consumption of resources and environmental pollution.In the environment of ecological civilization construction in our country,all provinces and cities have carried out the construction of Eco-industrial parks in full swing.Eco-industrial chain is the main structure of Eco-industrial parks.The most important thing to build Eco-industrial parks is to build a good Eco-industrial chain.However,there are some problems in the actual construction of ecological industry chain:industrial enterprises with economic benefits as the main goal pay more attention to the growth of economic benefits and lack of attention to the recycling of waste,and lack of enthusiasm to join the ecological industry chain and participate in the construction of the ecological industry chain.In addition,the stability of the Eco-industrial chain system determines the stability of the Eco-industrial parks.In an open environment,there are many factors that affect the stability of the Eco-industrial chain,which is easy to cause the instability or even collapse of the Eco-industrial chain.In this paper,first of all,through reading the relevant literature to sort out the influencing factors on the construction of the Eco-industrial chain,based on this,with the help of game theory research methods,we build a static game of incomplete information for upstream and downstream enterprises to choose whether to join the Eco-industrial chain,and a dynamic game model of complete information for waste transactions among enterprises,enterprises and governments,and analyze the relationship between different stakeholders How to choose strategies under the influence of influencing factors,and study the direction of various influencing factors on game equilibrium.The main conclusions are as follows:(1)economic benefits are the fundamental factors that affect the decision-making of enterprises.When the value of relevant factors is within a certain effective range,enterprises will choose to join the Eco-industrial chain;(2)Waste transaction price is a conflict of interest point between upstream and downstream enterprises.The higher the marginal cost of using waste resources to produce new products for downstream enterprises,the higher the cost of converting waste into raw materials for downstream enterprises to process,and the higher the cost of pollutant disposal for upstream enterprises,the lower the transaction price of waste;(3)The government can intervene the quantity and price of waste trade through financial subsidies for waste trade,and when the environmental benefits brought by the reuse of waste are higher,the government should give more subsidies.Then through the relevant literature sorting out the influencing factors on the stability of the Eco-industrial chain,on this basis,the evolutionary game theory is used to analyze the evolution process of enterprise cooperation in the Eco-industrial chain and the final possible equilibrium state,analyze the influence direction and conditions of the relevant factors on the stability of the Eco-industrial chain,and use numerical simulation to verify the theoretical analysis conclusion.The main conclusions are as follows:(1)when the upstream(downstream)link enterprises choose to exit,as long as the income of cooperation chosen by the enterprises themselves is greater than the income of exit chosen by the enterprises themselves,after a long-term evolution,all the enterprises in the Eco-industrial chain will choose cooperation strategies,and the system will achieve cooperation stability;and the larger the proportion of the enterprises that choose to cooperate in the initial state in the group,The faster the system reaches cooperative stability;(2)When the linked enterprises choose to exit and the income of cooperation is less than the income of exit,there are two evolutionary stable strategies(cooperation,cooperation)and(no cooperation,no cooperation).Which stable state the system will eventually evolve into is related to the initial state of cooperation;(3)The lower the cost of waste reuse is,the lower the risk cost of continuing cooperation is,the less the cost of maintaining cooperation is,and the more likely the system will eventually evolve into a stable state of cooperation;The higher the government subsidy is,the greater the spillover benefit brought by the cooperation,the higher the sunk cost when the enterprise chooses to exit,the greater the government punishment,the higher the cost of the enterprise's own disposal of pollutants,and the greater the possibility that the system will eventually evolve into a stable state of cooperation.