Research On The Game Of Cooperative Behavior Between The Prefabricated Building Industry Chain Platform And Enterprises

The cooperation between the prefabricated building industry chain platform and the prefabricated building-related enterprises is an effective way to realize the intelligent vertical integration of the prefabricated building industry chain and the value-added of the industry chain.At present,the platform is still in the early stage of development.The low enthusiasm of prefabricated building-related enterprises to participate in the platform construction make it difficult for the intelligent vertical integration of the prefabricated building industry chain to achieve an ideal state.In the actual integration process,the cooperative behavior between the prefabricated building industry chain platform and the prefabricated building-related enterprises is affected by factors such as cost,benefit and government intervention.Therefore,based on evolutionary game theory,this paper puts forward corresponding basic assumptions considering factors such as cost,benefit and government supervision intensity,and constructs evolutionary game model of cooperative behavior between prefabricated building industry chain platform and prefabricated building-related enterprises under pure market mechanism and government intervention.This paper discusses the evolutionary logic and the choice of evolutionary stability strategy of the cooperative behavior of both parties,and simulates the evolution process of the strategies of both parties in the game under different initial states and parameter changes.Based on the results of the analysis,this paper puts forward relevant optimization suggestions to promote the cooperation between the two parties,in order to provide a reference for accelerating the intelligent integration of the prefabricated building industry chain.The research results show that: under the pure market mechanism,whether the prefabricated building industry chain platform and the prefabricated building-related enterprises reach cooperation depends on the initial state,original cost and benefit,cooperation cost and benefit and other factors.The choice of cooperation strategies of both parties is positively correlated with the initial state,original cost and cooperation benefit,and negatively correlated with the original benefit and cooperation cost;under the government intervention,the probability of cooperation between the prefabricated building industry chain platform and prefabricated building-related enterprises will be higher.In addition to the factors such as cost,benefit,whether the two parties reach cooperation also depends on the government supervision intensity and the upper limit of subsidies.The choice of cooperation strategies of both parties is positively correlated with the government supervision intensity and the upper limit of subsidies.And there are two threshold for the intensity of government supervision.When the value is higher than the threshold,the two parties will surely reach stable cooperation.In addition,the threshold is negatively correlated with the original cost of both parties and positively correlated with the cooperation cost of both parties,so it should be adjusted dynamically in time according to the change of cost.According to the analysis results of the evolutionary game model,this paper puts forward some optimization suggestions to promote stable cooperation between the two parties in the case of unprofitable and profitable cooperation between the prefabricated building industry chain platform and the prefabricated building-related enterprises,so as to help improve the prefabricated building industry chain platform and prefabricated building-related enterprises on both sides of the cooperation intention,the benefits of cooperation,and reduce integration costs,to provide reference for promoting the intelligent integration of the prefabricated building industry chain.