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Research On Enterprise Carbon Emission Reduction Decision Based On Multi-level Equilibrium

Posted on:2021-02-03Degree:MasterType:Thesis
Country:ChinaCandidate:L L DingFull Text:PDF
GTID:2480306227495734Subject:Business Administration
Abstract/Summary:PDF Full Text Request
The externality of carbon emission reduction prevents the enthusiasm and initiative of enterprises from upgrading automatically.Therefore,the process of promoting enterprise emission reduction and implementing emission reduction target responsibilities is essential for policy promotion,incentives and constraints.The process is also a complex game process between the government,emission reduction companies and relevant stakeholders.Accordingly,this article starts from the general development law of enterprise carbon emission reduction,and expounds the development law and evolution process of enterprise carbon emission reduction from the initial stage,to the intermediate stage and finally to the advanced stage.On this basis,the enterprise is analyzed the specific characteristics of carbon emission reduction in different development stages and the development process of the rational level of each relevant subject reveal the behavioral motivation and interest demands of the parties in different stages of carbon emission reduction.Further,taking the development stage of corporate carbon emission reduction as a clue,according to the characteristics of different stages of corporate carbon emission reduction,a corresponding game model is constructed based on which the game nature and equilibrium conditions of different stages of corporate carbon emission reduction are analyzed,and relevant correlations are put forward in light of the actual.The countermeasures and suggestions can provide references for enterprises to make carbon emission reduction decisions and guide strategies formulated by government departments.In the initial stage of the development of carbon emission reduction,the players involved in the game are mainly government and enterprises.The nature of the game is a complete information static game.The government may use means to increase the penalty for negative emission reduction of enterprises to promote enterprise emission reduction.When carbon emission reduction develops to the intermediate stage,the players involved in this stage of the game are still government and enterprises.The nature of the game is principal-agent.The means that the government can use is to increase incentives for companies to actively reduce emissions and promote enterprise emissions reduction.Although the government's increase in carbon emission reduction income can effectively promote enterprise emission reduction,the "blood transfusion" subsidy is not a long-term plan.Only by improving the enterprise's emission reduction technology can it bring continuous emission reduction vitality to the enterprise.Therefore,when carbon emission reduction has advanced to an advanced stage,the government and enterprises agree on the importance of developing low-carbon technologies,but subject to their own technical bottlenecks,it is necessary to introduce third-party academic institutions to provide emission reduction technologies for emission reduction.The main players are enterprises,local governments and academic institutions,and the nature of the game is a tripartite evolutionary game.The means available to the government are,at the same time,to increase incentives for companies to actively reduce emissions and to develop low-carbon technologies for academic institutions to promote emission reduction.In the initial stage of carbon emission reduction,enterprises give priority to pursuing their own economic benefits.When the government 's punishment for passive emission reduction of enterprises is greater than the benefits available for passive emission reduction,enterprises will choose to actively reduce emissions.In the intermediate stage,companies can adjust their own emission reduction efforts to maximize returns based on agency contracts.In the advanced stage of carbon emission reduction,if the expected return from active emission reduction is greater than zero,the enterprise group tends to choose active emission reduction.However,carbon emission reduction is a complex process involving multiple parties and multiple stages.Therefore,in order to successfully promote carbon emission reduction,not only the enterprise itself needs to make correct emission reduction decisions,but also requires the guidance and incentives of the government,as well as relevant stakeholders coordination and cooperation.
Keywords/Search Tags:Carbon emission reduction, Nash equilibrium, Principal-agent, Evolutionary game, Carbon emission reduction decision
PDF Full Text Request
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