Research On Profit Allocation Of Shared Water Saving Management Contract Based On Bargaining Model

China is a country short of water resources.The problem of water shortage has seriously restricted the development of the economy and society.A large number of water control practices show that water saving is the most direct and effective measure to solve the problem of water shortage in China.Water Saving Management Contract(WSMC)is a new water-saving mode,which is provided with technical services and financial support by the Water Saving Company(WSCO),and the water-saving benefits are shared by the participants according to the contract.WSMC can effectively reduce the waste of water resources and improve the efficiency of water use.However,the lack of a revenue distribution scheme has seriously hindered the development and promotion of Shared WSMC.This dissertation will solve the problem of revenue distribution between owner and WSCO based on bargaining theory.Because the first bidder in the Rubinstein bargaining model has an obvious firstmover advantage.Based on this,the dissertation discusses the bidding order of the owner and WSCO and constructs a bargaining profit allocation model to overcome the firstmover advantage.First of all,both sides of the negotiation take the equilibrium bid when they first bid as the revenue allocation quota,and establish the initial profit allocation game model taking the total revenue as the reference;Second,this dissertation introduces the distribution difference and consumption factor to make the distribution result more perfect,and further establishes the difference allocation game model;Finally,Combined with the profit distribution game and difference allocation game,the profit distribution scheme of Shared WSMC project is obtained.The model built in this dissertation is applied to the WSMC project of the Hebei University of GC.The results show that the final quota of participants is related to discount factor,consumption factor,and fixed cost.Besides,considering that the risk of the break-up affects the negotiation process and its equilibrium result,this dissertation takes market competition as the main external factor and establishes a bargaining benefit distribution model with break-up risk.First of all,this dissertation identifies the key variables that affect the water-saving benefit and gives the distribution types of the corresponding variables according to the experience;Secondly,this dissertation estimated the water-saving benefits of the Shared WSMC project based on the Monte Carlo simulation and determined the size of the bargaining "cake" with the net present value as the measurement index;Finally,under the assumption of subjective belief of rupture risk,this dissertation takes market competition as the main external factor and solves the equilibrium allocation scheme between WSCO and owner based on the Muthoo bargaining model.The model built in this dissertation is applied to the WSMC project of Hebei University of GC.The results show that the factor of external competition has a greater impact on the equilibrium benefit distribution compared with the discount factor.At the same time,the more potential partners the participant have,the more advantage it have in the game of benefit distribution.The two models established in this dissertation solve the problem of revenue distribution of shared WSMC and supplement the methodology of revenue distribution of WSMC,which provides the basis for the contract decision-making of owner and WSCO to carry out the WSMC project.