Research On Evolutionary Game Of Regional Science And Technology Cooperation Based On Complex Network

With the rapid development of science-technology,the globalization of science-technology has become the theme of the times.The traditional territory of scientific-technical cooperation with other countries can no longer meet the needs of the times.China’s science-technology urgently needs to find its own way of internationalization of science-technology cooperation with other countries to cope with the development of the times,It is urgent for China to find its own international cooperation path to cope with the development of the scientific era,so regional science and technology cooperation has become an inevitable choice.This paper studies the content of regional scientific-technological cooperation by using evolutionary game theory and network evolution theory,assuming enterprises as the main players in the evolutionary game system,the game behavior of regional science and technology cooperation in the alliance is divided into the game behavior between cooperative individuals and the game evolution behavior within the population.Based on the hypothesis of bounded rationality and limited resources of game participants,on the one hand,By analyzing the stability of differential equation about cooperative individuals’ static bilateral science-technology evolutionary game behavior,we find the existence of the critical value of the game system.The critical state is extremely unstable,which is easily affected by the positive and negative benefits of the game system,resulting in different stable states of bilateral science and technology game results.Then it is concluded that the early cooperation probability,cultural mutual trust and learning ability are important factors affecting the development of cooperation path.On the other hand,the scale-free network theory is used to discuss the evolutionary game behavior within the population.It is found that increasing the average degree of the network will inhibit the cooperator density of the scale-free network game group.And the temptation rate of betrayal is to inhibit the emergence of cooperation behavior in the regional science-technology cooperation group.Only near the Hub node of the enterprise can resist the invasion of betrayal strategy in the enterprise group to a certain extent.Based on the theoretical research,this paper uses MATLAB software to analyze the game behavior of regional science-technology cooperation,and further demonstrates the rationality of the model.