Research On Moral Hazard Prevention Of Residents’ Social Medical Insurance From The Perspective Of Game Theory

In the current society,moral hazard has become a common phenomenon in our daily life,and there are also considerable moral hazards in the field of social security.Due to its unique status and role,social medical insurance has far-reaching influence on moral hazard,which not only wastes considerable medical resources,but also directly affects the long-term and stable development of social medical insurance.Based on the principal-agent model,the complex game between the three parties is divided and simplified.In the game between the two parties,the rational person is taken as the basic code of conduct,and the game behavior of the three parties is divided into various links.The comparative analysis is carried out in different situations,so as to explore the control strategy of moral hazard in social medical insurance.In the game among the three parties,rational economic people will only consider their own interests.We can see that for social security institutions,as long as the loss they suffer is greater than the cost of reviewing medical insurance expenditure,social security institutions will choose to review the society.The game equilibrium between the insurance institutions and the insured is that social security institutions do not review,and the insured does not violate the rules.The game between the insured and medical institutions is in a mixed game,and the strategy choice of both sides varies according to the change of the punishment of social security institutions.If the social security institutions increase the punishment of the insured,in the short term we can obviously solve the occurrence of violations,but in the long term this does not improve the occurrence of moral hazard.Increase penalties for medical institutions,we can draw not only in the short term and long term is also conducive to curb the occurrence of moral hazard.At the same time,due to the existence of third-party payment in the whole social security process,the reimbursement expenses of social security institutions are determined by the services provided by medical institutions to the insured,but the types and scope of the services provided are mostly determined by medical institutions,and the insured will often not refuse.This phenomenon is particularly obvious in social security,especially in serious illness medical care.Therefore,regulating the payment process of services and expenses provided by medical institutions by social security institutions can also control the occurrence of moral hazard to a certain extent.Here we can draw payment reform can be intuitive restrictions on both supply and demand.At the same time,it can also optimize the operation system of social medical insurance in China.