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Research On The Cooperation Mechanism Of My Country's Catastrophe Insurance Market Based On Game Theor

Posted on:2024-03-11Degree:MasterType:Thesis
Country:ChinaCandidate:A Q LiFull Text:PDF
GTID:2530307106479384Subject:Financial
Abstract/Summary:PDF Full Text Request
China is one of the few countries in the world with frequent disasters and serious losses,catastrophe will cause huge property losses and casualties,and with the development of the economy,the direct and indirect economic losses caused by catastrophe are also increasing.Most of the catastrophe loss sharing methods used in China are government assistance,but it has also indirectly led to the shortage of the commercial insurance market.Catastrophe insurance is the best risk management tool to deal with disaster risks,but China’s disaster financing still lacks in both the pre-event and market directions,and the functions and roles of insurance have not been fully utilized.Therefore,with the help of the risk transfer function of insurance,how to explore the long-term development mode and risk sharing mechanism of catastrophe insurance with Chinese characteristics,so as to relieve the pressure of government rescue funds and enhance the protection ability of catastrophe risk is a major theoretical and practical issue that needs to be urgently solved at present.Firstly,by constructing an evolutionary game model involving the government,residents and insurance companies,and using evolutionary stabilization strategies and replication dynamic processes to explore the equilibrium of the catastrophe insurance market and the influencing factors that promote the equilibrium of the evolutionary game under the current participation mechanism of bounded rationality,this paper finds the problems existing in the existing catastrophe insurance system in China.Secondly,starting from the idea of considering the supply side,the bancassurance cooperation mechanism is introduced,and the"bancassurance" cooperative game model is constructed to analyze the key factors in the longterm stable cooperation of bancassurance,and on this basis,the "bancassurance" cooperative benefit distribution mechanism model is established to solve the optimal extraction ratio of"bancassurance" cooperative benefit distribution.The government-led catastrophe insurance cooperation mechanism should not only solve the problem of long-term cooperation on the supply side of "banking and insurance",but also solve the problem of long-term cooperation on the demand side of "government,bank and people".To this end,starting from the idea of considering the demand side,the banking system entities are introduced,the cooperation mechanism of "government,bank and people" is established,the four-party alliance game model is constructed,and the Shapely value method is used to demonstrate the stability of the four-party cooperation mechanism of "government+bank+insurance company+residents"and the promotion effect on the purchase of catastrophe insurance by residents.Finally,this paper comprehensively analyzes the stability and effectiveness of various cooperation mechanisms in the catastrophe insurance market,so as to adjust and optimize the catastrophe risk sharing mechanism,and provide new suggestions for alleviating the pressure of government relief funds and forming a multi-level catastrophe risk diversification mechanism with financial support.
Keywords/Search Tags:Catastrophe Insurance, Evolutionary Game, Cooperative Game, Government Relief, Capital Allocation
PDF Full Text Request
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