Research On The Influence Of Environmental Regulation On Overcapacity In China's Steel Industry

Overcapacity is widespread in China's steel industry,hindering the upgrading of industrial structure.On March 5,2018,Premier Li Keqiang emphasized in the work report of the two sessions of the two governments that the structural reform of the supply side should be further promoted,the new kinetic energy should be developed and expanded,and the ineffective supply would continue to be eliminated.The task of "decapacity" is still the top priority.At the same time,the unclear property rights of environmental resources and the imperfect environmental protection related systems have made the production costs of steel enterprises severely externalized,which has intensified the phenomenon of excessive investment and overcapacity in the steel industry,which has seriously threatened the normal development of the market and enterprises themselves.The impact of research environmental regulation on overcapacity will help to use market-based methods to effectively increase capacity utilization,promote industrial restructuring and upgrading,and have important implications for promoting substantial progress in supply-side structural reforms.Based on bounded rationality and applying evolutionary game theory,this paper analyzes the three-party game equilibrium of the central government,local governments and steel enterprises in the implementation of environmental regulation policies,and then uses the replication dynamic equation to obtain the equilibrium points of the threeparty game.The system's evolutionary stability strategy and corresponding stability conditions are derived.Finally,numerical simulation is used to simulate the influence of various parameters on the evolution path and speed of the system in different situations,and then the impact of environmental regulation on overcapacity in China's steel industry is explored.The results show that when the three parties adopt the optimal evolutionary strategy of joint participation in governance,the decision of the central government is to implement command-and-control environmental regulation;the behavior of local governments and enterprises depends on the central government's governance costs,incentive subsidies and penalties.Reducing governance costs,increasing incentive subsidies,and penalizing benefits can help accelerate local government and business participation in capacity management.In terms of empirical research,this paper analyzes the capacity utilization rate of China's steel industry,and establishes an econometric model to analyze the feasibility of China's environmental regulation and environmental management to achieve a winwin situation.The results show that the overcapacity in China's steel industry is still very serious.And the overcapacity is moving from the eastern and central regions to the western region;environmental regulation has a significant positive effect on the capacity utilization rate of the steel industry,and promotes capacity utilization through the two channels of cost effect and innovation compensation effect.Through the combination of theory and empirical analysis,this paper puts forward some scientific and reasonable suggestions for overcapacity:focus on reducing governance costs and limiting local government intervention ability,establish a reasonable and scientific local government performance evaluation system,and improve the central government and local government.The reward and punishment system between the two;build a sound steel industry market capacity replacement indicator trading information system,and create and optimize a unified information platform.Finally,the paper summarizes and thinks about this paper,and further proposes the research prospects for future research.