| The Chinese government promised to reduce the carbon dioxide intensity per unit of GDP by60% to 65% in 2030 comparing with 2005.In order to achieve the target,China will gradually build a nationwide carbon trading market based on seven carbon-trading pilots.The initial allocation of carbon dioxide emission rights is essential for the stable and efficient operation of the carbon trading system.Auction has the advantages of reducing abatement costs and reducing corporate resistance,which has been widely adopted by carbon trading markets in countries and regions such as the European Union.There are many problems in the current implementation of the system,for example,the system cannot be flexibly adjusted,and the auction-clearing price is too low and unstable.This paper adopts multi-round auction as the distribution method.The model takes into account perspectives of government and enterprises to establish fair and flexible auction rules and multiangle appraisal indices.In addition,this paper analyzes the auction strategies in different stages of enterprises.Then,with the help of simulation,the paper studies the influence of government regulation,enterprise attributes and economic environment on the auction price,auction efficiency and enterprise participation enthusiasm.The results show that:(1)By adopting multi-round auction,the government can flexibly optimize the control policies by effectively utilizing the information presented by the company during the auction process,which can stabilize the clearing price of carbon emission rights,improve the auction efficiency and encourage the enterprises to participate actively.(2)The impact of total carbon emission rights control and economic environment on auctions is more significant than other factors,and the reduction of total carbon emission rights and the decline of economic environment influence auctions more significantly.(3)The influence of corporate attributes on auctions is limited,and auction rules are fairer to all types of enterprises. |