Study On Dynamic Game And Equilibrium Strategy Of Low Carbon Agricultural Products Supply Chain

This year,China’s agriculture has achieved fruitful results,but the traditional consumption-oriented production mode,which exhausts the agricultural resources while fishing excessively,severely damages the ecological environment,makes improper use of agricultural resources,pollutes the agricultural environment,and so on,has caused adverse effects on China’s agricultural development.In order to realize the sustainable development of agriculture,the agricultural ecological environment is effectively protected,and the agricultural resources are efficiently utilized,so it is imperative to develop low-carbon agriculture.To ensure national food security,food security,resource security and ecological environment security,it is necessary to promote the development of agricultural low-carbon life,which maintains the well-being of contemporary people and provides a beautiful natural environment for future generations to develop healthily for a long time,which is of profound significance.The development of low-carbon agriculture needs a set of perfect system and corresponding management theory.Low-carbon supply chain management is an important measure to adapt to the current economic and social development.Enterprises in the supply chain should actively undertake the heavy responsibility of low-carbon emission reduction,and implement low-carbon supply chain management under the jurisdiction of the government.This paper mainly studies from two aspects: supply chain production and management subjects and supply chain supervision subjects.First,it studies the evolutionary game trend and influencing factors of incomplete information cooperation among low-carbon agricultural products supply chain subjects.Starting from the three-level supply chain of producers,wholesalers and sellers,it discusses three evolutionary game situations of information cooperation among producers,wholesalers,wholesalers and sellers,and producers,wholesalers and retailers.Secondly,it studies the government’s carbon emission regulation and analyzes the influencing factors of enterprises’ low-carbon supply chain management.From the perspective of public media supervision,the evolutionary game model of government and enterprise is constructed on the assumption that government and enterprise and public media are bounded rationality.Under the supervision of public media,this paper analyzes the dynamic game process of government and enterprises and the change trend of decision-making under different parameter settings.The results are simulated and analyzed by software.The results show that when the players in the supply chain choose cooperative benefits to be greater than those in the non-cooperative situation,and the evolutionary game system finally tends to cooperative game strategy,so that the overall and individual benefits can be maximized.At the same time,when the public media play a supervisory role in the game process,which directly affects the strategic choice between the government and agricultural enterprises,it is found that strengthening the media supervision is beneficial,but when the public media supervision is stronger,it makes the government inert and weakens the regulatory effectiveness.Finally,in order to improve the effectiveness of supervision,public media supervision was introduced,and reasonable countermeasures were put forward.Through the research,it is concluded that if we call for the implementation of low-carbon supply chain management,we need the active cooperation of the main enterprises in the supply chain to promote information sharing,and the government and the public media need to establish an integrated platform of supervision,strengthen market supervision and realize low-carbon emission reduction,which is the duty and responsibility of every citizen.