The Research On Port Cluster Carbon Emission Reduction Based On Dynamic Game Theory

Port is one of the important nodes of modern logistics,port cluster is the outcome for the development of scale and function to a certain stage of the port,both them have made important contributions to the development of the national and regional economic growth.But with the surge in business,port operations have had a huge negative impact on the local environment.One of the most serious is carbon emissions.To promote the sustainable development of the economy and society,China have already committed to peak carbon dioxide emission before 2030,and achieve carbon neutrality before 2060.It is imperative for the port cluster to implement carbon emission reduction actions.However,achieving “the dual carbon” target of the port industry is a complex and arduous systematic project,which requires concerted efforts from all sectors of society.Therefore,under the dual carbon background,the study on the carbon emission reduction of port cluster has to cater to the development trend of port economy and environment,and it is a problem worth examining.Based on the existing stakeholders’ theories and environmental regulation theories,the analysis draws that port enterprises,local governments and shippers have a significant impact on management practices.The existing studies show that voluntary regulation,government regulation and carbon tax subsidy are the most effective environmental regulations at present.This study focuses on the co-opetition and low carbon development of port cluster using dynamic game tools such as differential game and evolutionary game to conduct quantitative research on the environmental problems.Three dynamic game models of port group carbon emission reduction considering port corporate social responsibility(CSR),government regulation and shippers’ low carbon preferences are established to explore the evolution of carbon emission reduction strategies among stakeholders such as enterprises,governments and shippers within the port clusters.The impacts of different environmental regulations on the environmental governance of port clusters are analyzed.The results of this study can provide scientific guidance for the governance of port carbon emissions and other environmental problems.The main conclusions are summarized as follows.(1)Differential game models in port cluster carbon emission reduction with CSR.The linear differential game of carbon emission reduction for asymmetric Cournot duopoly ports is studied in a port cluster.Port 1 with CSR is a responsible enterprise considering environmental governance and social welfare,while port 2 only pursues profit maximization in the game.The differential game models of the two ports are established respectively.The Hamilton function was constructed to solve the necessary conditions for the optimization of the two ports,and the steady-state equilibrium and optimal strategy expressions for carbon emission reduction of the port cluster were given.Then the steady-state equilibrium and numerical simulation were analyzed.The results show that the CSR coefficient significantly affects the optimal demand,profit and total revenue.Carbon emission of the port cluster,total demand and total profits are slightly affected by the CSR coefficient,while the investment in carbon emission reduction technology R&D is not affected by the CSR coefficient at all.Second,the profit,demand and total revenue of the CSR port 1 perform better in the case of large market size,but it also tends to cause a surge in carbon emissions in port cluster.In addition,market size,the carbon emission internalizes ratio,carbon emission reduction governance efficiency and investment cost also significantly affect the carbon emission and carbon emission reduction R&D investment of the port cluster.Finally,the unit carbon emission rate,discount rate and attenuation rate also have a significant impact on the carbon emissions,but they have little influence on other equilibrium solutions.(2)Differential game model in joint carbon emission reduction for port cluster with different government regulation.We comparatively studied the differential game of carbon emission reduction of two ports with different territorial regulatory policies in one port cluster.The two differential game models for carbon emission reduction of port cluster under government and non-government supervision are established respectively,and the steadystate equilibrium and optimal strategy expressions of carbon emission reduction of port cluster under two kinds of supervision are obtained.And a series of deductions are presented through model analysis.Then,numerical examples and sensitivity analysis are used to verify the previous deductions.The results show that the joint carbon emission reduction level and demand of port cluster is positively correlated with the port enterprises’ degree of carbon emission reduction efforts,government’s carbon emission reduction incentives and penalties,and the low carbon sensitivity of shippers,and the value under government supervision is higher than that non-government supervision.The port cluster members’ degree of carbon emission reduction efforts is markedly influenced by their own effort coefficient,government’s carbon emission reduction incentives and penalties,and the shippers’ low carbon sensitivity.The profit of port cluster members is also obviously affected by the port enterprises’ degree of carbon emission reduction efforts,industrial carbon emission standards,and the low carbon sensitivity of shippers,but the impacts are completely different.(3)The Evolutionary game in carbon emission reduction between the government and port cluster considering the shippers’ low-carbon preferences.Taking the low-carbon preferences of shippers as a factor to influence the port enterprises to formulate behavior strategies,and based on the evolutionary game theory,this paper studies the effect of government carbon tax and subsidy on supervising and guiding port enterprises to conduct carbon emission reduction activities.The four evolutionary game models of carbon emission reduction behavior strategies among the government and port enterprises under different carbon tax and subsidy combinations are constructed respectively.And the evolution and stability strategies of government and port enterprises are analyzed.Then,the evolution paths of government and port enterprises considering the low carbon preferences of shippers under different carbon tax and subsidy combinations are explored by numerical simulation.The results show that when the static mechanism implement,the behavior strategy evolution of the government and port enterprises cannot reach the stable point,and their evolution path shows periodic fluctuation.Different dynamic mechanisms can make the evolutionary system reach the asymptotic stability point and produce different evolutionary paths with different advantages.The cost of government regulation and enterprise carbon emission reduction governance have significant influence on the government and port enterprises to formulate behavior strategies.In general,the government plays a leading role in guiding port enterprises to implement carbon emission reduction actions,and the shippers play driving role in the low-carbon actions of the government and port enterprises.